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Abstract: In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with
general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly
selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q ≤ n players have to agree on
a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium payoﬀs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement
rules other than the unanimity rule, the equilibrium payoﬀs need not be unique.
Furthermore, even when the equilibrium is unique, it need not be eﬃcient. Journal
of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C73, C78, D70.
Keywords: Noncooperative bargaining, voting rules, stochastic games.Majority Rule 2
1. Introduction
Many real bargaining situations involve negotiations among more than two players
over the allocation of some surplus. In some contexts, agreement entails the unan-
imous consent of all negotiating parties. For example, in a Chapter 11 corporate
bankruptcy negotiation, all classes of creditors have to agree on a plan to restructure
the bankrupt ﬁrm. In other contexts, agreement among only a subset of the players
is suﬃcient to implement a particular allocation. For example, when political parties
in a parliamentary democracy bargain over the formation of a new government, a
simple majority is typically enough to determine the allocation of cabinet ministries
among the parties represented in the parliament.1
Most of the existing theoretical literature on multilateral bargaining restricts at-
tention to unanimity games (see, e.g., the survey in Osborne and Rubinstein [15]).
Notable exceptions are the papers by Baron and Ferejohn [3], Harrington [10], Baron
and Kalai [4], Eraslan [7], and Banks and Duggan [2]. These papers study (complete
information) multilateral sequential bargaining games with random proposers and
general agreement rules which build on Rubinstein’s [17] “divide-the-dollar” game.
In these n-player games (n ≥ 3), at least q players (q ∈ {1,...,n}) have to agree on
how to allocate a certain amount of surplus, and the discounted value of the surplus
decreases in a deterministic fashion with each rejected oﬀer.2
1In other political negotiations, qualiﬁed majorities are sometime required to implement speciﬁc
agreements. For example, a 5/7 (super)majority rule is used in the European Council.
2Banks and Duggan [2] consider a more general framework by allowing the object of the ne-
gotiation to be multidimensional. Even in their model, however, the set of feasible agreements is
ﬁxed.Majority Rule 3
Merlo and Wilson [12, 13] consider a general class of multilateral bargaining games
where the surplus to be allocated follows a stochastic process. In many negotiations,
the terms of an agreement may depend on aspects of the environment which change
during the negotiating process. In such cases, the surplus to be allocated may evolve
over time according to a stochastic process.3 To provide an analog to the paradigm
of the “divide-the-dollar” game in deterministic environments, in a stochastic envi-
ronment we may think of the “divide-the-yen” game, where the dollar value of the
surplus to be allocated oscillates stochastically over time.4 In their analysis of this
class of games, Merlo and Wilson [12, 13] restrict attention to games with unanimity
rule.
In this paper, we combine the two literatures and consider multilateral stochastic
bargaining models with general agreement rules. The game we study is an n-player
game with a q-quota agreement rule. In each period a state is realized which deter-
mines the total utility to be allocated if an agreement is reached in that period, and
a player is randomly selected to make a proposal. The selected player may either
propose an allocation or pass. If he proposes an allocation, each of the remaining
players in turn accepts or rejects the proposal. If more than n − q players reject the
proposal or the proposer passes, a new state is realized, a new proposer is selected,
3We have in mind a situation where agents bargain over complex agreements and a complete set
of contingent contracts is not available. For a detailed description of the environment see Merlo and
Wilson [12].
4For an application of a stochastic bargaining model to the process of government formation
in a parliamentary democracy, see Merlo [11]. Eraslan [8] uses a stochastic model to analyze the
negotiations behind bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held corporations. For a discussion
of other possible applications see Merlo and Wilson [13].Majority Rule 4
and the process is repeated until q players agree upon some proposed allocation. We
characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs and establish
their existence.5
For the class of games we consider, if the surplus to be allocated is restricted
to be constant over time, Baron and Ferejohn [3] and Eraslan [7] have shown that
for any agreement rule there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
payoﬀ. Furthermore, the equilibrium is eﬃcient and an agreement is reached in the
ﬁrst period. When the surplus to be allocated is allowed to evolve stochastically over
time, Merlo and Wilson [13] have shown that under unanimity rule there exists a
unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ. Furthermore, the equilibrium
is eﬃcient, even though it may involve delays.6 In this paper, we show that when
the surplus to be allocated is allowed to evolve stochastically over time, for general
agreement rules the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ need not be unique.
Furthermore, even when the equilibrium is unique, for any agreement rule other than
unanimity it need not be eﬃcient. In particular, the kind of ineﬃciency that may
emerge in equilibrium is induced by the fact that agreement may be reached “too
soon.”
5It is well know that in (deterministic and stochastic) multilateral bargaining games like the
ones considered here, if players are suﬃciently patient, then any allocation of the surplus can be
sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀ regardless of the agreement rule (see, e.g., Baron
and Ferejohn [3] and Merlo and Wilson [12]). Stationarity, on the other hand, typically selects a
unique equilibrium (see, e.g., Baron and Ferejohn [3], Eraslan [7], and Merlo and Wilson [13]). Like
these papers, we restrict attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria.
6Once we suppose that the discounted size of the surplus need not decline in every period, a
temporary delay in agreement should not be unexpected as a possible equilibrium outcome. As
shown by Merlo and Wilson [13], delays are, however, eﬃcient.Majority Rule 5
The intuition for our results is as follows. Whenever agreement entails less than
unanimous approval, there exists a diﬀerential treatment between the players who are
included in a proposal (i.e., those who are allocated a positive share of the surplus)
and the players who are excluded (i.e., those who are allocated a zero share). In a
stochastic environment, there may be incentives for the players to delay agreement
until a larger level of surplus is realized. If all players have veto power (i.e., in the
unanimity game), then the interests of all players are aligned in their pursuit of the
optimal time to agree (see Merlo and Wilson [13]). If, on the other hand, agreement
among only a subset of the players is suﬃcient to implement an allocation, then while
all players may gain in expected terms by waiting, the actual gains from waiting will
be captured only by those players who will be included in the proposal that ultimately
will be agreed upon. This tension generates the possibility of ineﬃcient agreements
where players fail to realize the gains from waiting. It may also generate multiplicity
of equilibrium payoﬀs. Players who are oﬀered a positive payoﬀ in a state where the
level of surplus is relatively small may be induced to accept it if they expect to be
excluded from future agreements when the level of surplus is relatively large. This
in turn may induce the proposer to make such a proposal in that state even though
there exists other equilibria where no proposal is made in that state and payoﬀs are
higher.
Before turning our attention to the analysis of the game, a few remarks are in
order. Our paper is related to the literature on noncooperative coalitional bargaining
games. In fact, q-quota games are a special class of n-person games in coalitionalMajority Rule 6
form. In the context of these models, Chatterjee et al. [5] and Okada [14] show
that when the surplus to be divided is non stochastic but depends on a coalition, the
conﬂict inherent in coalition formation may induce an ineﬃcient stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium payoﬀ.
Our results are also relevant for the literature on the relative desirability of alter-
native voting rules. For instance, in the context of models of collective choice under
uncertainty, Feddersen and Pesendorfer [9] illustrate the inferiority of the unanimity
rule.7 In the context of multilateral stochastic bargaining games with complete infor-
mation, our analysis indicates that the unanimity rule dominates all other (q-quota)
voting rules.
The two key features of the bargaining games we consider are a stochastic sur-
plus and a q-quota agreement rule. To further motivate our analysis, consider the
following concrete bargaining situation that can be analyzed using our theoretical
framework. The process of government formation in a parliamentary democracy en-
tails bargaining among the set of parties represented in parliament over the allocation
of cabinet ministries. Approval of a government proposal requires the support of a
simple parliamentary majority. Furthermore, bargaining over governments takes time
and a stochastic environment best describes the changing political and economic sit-
uation while parties bargain over the formation of a new government.8 Since political
7See also Austen-Smith and Banks [1] and Persico [16].
8For example, Merlo [11] reports that the average duration of a negotiation over the formation
of a new government in Italy is 5 weeks and the maximum duration is 18 weeks.Majority Rule 7
and economic variables aﬀect government stability and a more durable government
implies a larger level of surplus, these considerations lead one to consider a bargaining
environment where the surplus to be divided follows a stochastic process.9
2. The Game
Consider the following class of stochastic bargaining games with complete informa-
tion. Let {σt}∞
t=0 denote an independently and identically distributed stochastic pro-
cess with state space S and distribution function F, where S is a closed Borel subset
of [0, ¯ s], with 0 < ¯ s < ∞.10 Let N = {1,...,n} denote a set of players, where n ≥ 2.
We refer to an element s ∈ S as a state, and an element i ∈ N as a player. A state
s ∈ S denotes the size of the surplus to be divided among the players, if they agree in
that state. For t = 0,1,2..., let σt ≡ (σ0,σ1,...,σt) denote the t-period state-history,
with typical realization (s0,s1,...,st).
Players have an identical single date payoﬀ function which is linear in their surplus
share and discount the future at a common discount factor β ∈ (0,1).11 For any state
s ∈ S, let X(s) ≡ {x ∈ I Rn
+ :
Pn
i=1 xi ≤ s} denote the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors to
be allocated in state s. For an allocation x ∈ X(s), xi denotes the amount of surplus
9For a more detailed explanation of the stochastic nature of the surplus in negotiations over the
formation of a new government see Merlo [11]. Notice that in the context of this application, the
assumption of random proposers–the third main feature of the bargaining game we consider–can
also be justiﬁed on empirical grounds (see Diermeier and Merlo [6]).
10Merlo and Wilson [12, 13] consider a general Markov process. While our characterization extends
to the more general case, the analysis becomes signiﬁcantly more complex. We therefore restrict
attention to the i.i.d. case.
11Like Baron and Ferejohn [3] and Merlo and Wilson [13], we consider bargaining games with
transferable utility.Majority Rule 8
awarded to player i.
For any player i ∈ N, let pi denote the time and state invariant probability player
i is selected as proposer in each period, where pi ≥ 0,
P
i∈N pi = 1.
Let q ∈ {1,...,n} denote the number of players who have to agree on a proposal
to induce its acceptance. We refer to the following game as a q-quota game. In
period zero, after state s is realized, a player is selected as proposer. The proposer
can pass or propose an allocation in X(s). If he proposes an allocation, all other
players respond sequentially (in some ﬁxed order) by either accepting or rejecting the
proposal.12 An agreement is reached if q players (including the proposer) accept the
proposal. Otherwise a new state s0 is realized and a new proposer is selected in the
next period. This process continues until an allocation is proposed and accepted.
When q = n, the agreement rule is unanimity and the game is a special case of
Merlo and Wilson [13]. When q = 1, the proposer is a one period dictator. If n is
odd, when q = (n + 1)/2, the agreement rule is majority rule. For a general q, we
refer to the agreement rule as a q-quota rule.13
An outcome for the q-quota game is a random vector (ηq,τq) where τq is a stopping
time and ηq is measurable with respect to στq and satisﬁes ηq ∈ X(στq) if τq is ﬁnite
and ηq = 0, otherwise. Given a realization of σ, τq denotes the period in which a
proposal is accepted, and ηq denotes the proposed allocation which is accepted in
12The actual order in which players respond to a proposal does not aﬀect the results of the model.
Therefore, we leave the order unspeciﬁed.
13When the distribution F is degenerate, the game reduces to the one studied by Baron and
Ferejohn [3] and Eraslan [7].Majority Rule 9
state στq. Deﬁne β∞ = 0. Then in the game outcome (ηq,τq), the von Neumann-
Morgenstern payoﬀ vector is given by E[βτqηq]. For notational simplicity, in the rest
of the paper we suppress the subscript q unless required by the context.
A history at date t, ht, is a sequence of realized states, proposers, and actions
taken up to date t. A (behavior) strategy for player i, ψi, is a probability distribution
over feasible actions for each date t and history at date t. A strategy proﬁle ψ is a
n-tuple of strategies, one for each player. Let G(ht) denote the game from date t on
with history ht. Let ψ|ht denote the restriction of ψ to the histories consistent with
ht. Then ψ|ht is a strategy proﬁle on G(ht). A strategy proﬁle ψ is subgame perfect
(SP) if, for every history ht, ψ|ht is a Nash equilibrium of G(ht). A strategy proﬁle is
stationary if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on the current level of
surplus, proposer and oﬀer. A stationary, subgame perfect (SSP) outcome and payoﬀ
are the outcome and payoﬀ generated by an SSP strategy proﬁle.
3. Characterization of SSP Payoﬀs
In this section, we characterize the set of SSP payoﬀs and establish their existence.
In our characterization we focus on the SSP continuation payoﬀs.14 Let v denote the
von Neumann-Morgenstern continuation payoﬀ vector generated by an SSP strategy
proﬁle. In the remainder of the paper, we simply refer to an SSP continuation payoﬀ
14Unlike the actual (realized) SSP payoﬀs, the SSP continuation payoﬀs do not depend on the
identity of the proposer, whether or not the proposer makes a proposal, and, when a proposal is
made, the identity of the players included in the proposal. This simpliﬁes the characterization of
the equilibrium payoﬀs. Note that, given an SSP continuation payoﬀ, the actual SSP payoﬀ can be
easily computed.Majority Rule 10
vector as an SSP payoﬀ vector. Let Mi denote the set of n-dimensional real vectors
such that the ith component is zero and let e ∈ I Rn denote the n-dimensional unit
vector.


















where for all i ∈ N, (rij)n














1 if s −
P
j6=i rijvj > vi
0 if s −
P
j6=i rijvj < vi
(3)
Proof: Suppose the vector of SSP continuation payoﬀs is given by v. Fix s and
let i denote the proposer. Consider an SSP response to a proposal x ∈ X(s). PlayerMajority Rule 11
j accepts the proposal if xj ≥ vj and rejects it if xj < vj. As it is common in
the literature on sequential bargaining, we impose the (mild) restriction on a player’s
strategy that a player always accepts a proposal that gives him his continuation payoﬀ
(even though he is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the proposal).
Note that the proposer needs only q−1 votes in addition to his vote for a proposal
to be accepted. Then, if the proposer decides to make an oﬀer that will be accepted,









Let Γi denote the set of minimizers of (4). Note that an SSP proposal in pure
strategies by player i can be identiﬁed by the (n − 1)-dimensional vector which
speciﬁes the players to whom player i oﬀers their continuation payoﬀ. Thus, each
γi = (γij)n
j=1 ∈ Γi corresponds to a pure proposal. A minimizer of (2), however, does
not necessarily correspond to a pure proposal. Rather, it corresponds to a mixed
proposal, where player i randomizes over the proposals corresponding to the elements
in Γi (possibly with degenerate probabilities).
Notice that any proposal corresponding to an element in Γi yields the same payoﬀ
to player i. Hence, in equilibrium, player i randomizes over such proposals. It can
be veriﬁed that rij is a minimizer of (2) if and only if there exists a probabilityMajority Rule 12





In other words, randomizing over pure proposals is payoﬀ equivalent to oﬀering
mixed proposals. Intuitively, rij denotes the probability that player j is oﬀered his
continuation payoﬀ when player i is the proposer who proposes an allocation that will
be accepted.
If player i oﬀers an allocation in state s that is accepted, this allocation yields the
payoﬀ s−
P
j6=i rijvj to the proposer and it yields the expected payoﬀ rijvj to player
j. If no proposal is accepted in state s, then all the players receive their continuation
payoﬀs.
Given these restrictions on the SSP strategies, a payoﬀ maximizing proposer ob-
tains a payoﬀ of s −
P
j6=i rijvj from any SSP proposal that is accepted. But the
proposer can also guarantee himself vi by passing. Then the proposer oﬀers an allo-









rijvj < vi,Majority Rule 13






Let αi(s) denote the probability that player i proposes an allocation that will be
accepted in state s. Then αi(s) must satisfy the restrictions imposed in equation
(3). Note that while it is sensible to assume that a player accepts a proposal that
makes him indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting, there is no natural argument
to break the proposer’s indiﬀerence between proposing and passing.
In equilibrium, the oﬀer probabilities rij and proposal probabilities αi must induce
the continuation payoﬀs v, that is, v = βE[v]. Note that in this expression the
expectation is taken over the recognition probabilities as well as next period’s state.
Next we show that this is satisﬁed by equation (1).
Let s denote the next period’s state. With probability pi, player i is the proposer
next period. With probability αi(s) player i proposes an allocation that will be
accepted in which case his payoﬀ is s−
P
j6=i rijvj. With probability 1−αi(s) player
i passes and receives his continuation payoﬀ vi. Thus, conditional on being the





rijvj) + (1 − αi(s))vi] (5)
Now consider the case when player i is not the proposer next period. With probability
pj, player j 6= i is the proposer. Player j proposes an allocation that will be acceptedMajority Rule 14
with probability αj(s) in which case the expected payoﬀ to player i is rjivi. With
probability 1 − αj(s) player j passes in which case player i receives his continuation
payoﬀ vi. Thus, conditional on not being the proposer, next period’s expected payoﬀ




pj[αj(s)rjivi + (1 − αj(s))vi] (6)
By (5) and (6) the continuation payoﬀ for player i is given by equation (1).
To complete the proof consider the following strategy. When player i is not the
proposer, he accepts a proposal if and only if the proposal gives him at least vi. When
player i is the proposer in state s, he proposes an allocation with probability αi(s)
and passes with probability 1 − αi(s). If he proposes an allocation, the allocation he
proposes is (xi,xj) with probability π(γi), where




and for all j 6= i
xj = γijvj,
and πi(.) is the probability distribution on Γi that induces the oﬀer probabilities
rij. Clearly, this strategy implements the payoﬀs given by (1) and no player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from it.Majority Rule 15
Our characterization of the SSP payoﬀs is based on the observation that, if agree-
ment is reached in any period of the q-quota game, the proposer may extract any
surplus over what the “cheapest” q − 1 other players obtain by delaying agreement
until the next period.15 Note that for any player i ∈ N and for any state s ∈ S, αi(s)
is the probability player i makes a proposal in state s, and (rij)n
j=1 is the vector of
probabilities player i oﬀers their continuation payoﬀ to any other player. If a proposal
is made in any period, it is accepted. If no proposal is made in a period, then all the
players receive their continuation payoﬀ.
For any v ∈ I Rn deﬁne r(v;q) = r1(v;q) × ... × rn(v;q) where ri(v;q) is the set
of minimizers to the program deﬁned in (2). Let α(r,v) = α1(r,v) × ... × αn(r,v)
where αi(r,v) is the set of proposal probabilities that satisfy equation (3). Given


















for all i ∈ N.
15In the proof, we impose the restriction that a player votes in favor of a proposal whenever he
is indiﬀerent between accepting the proposal and rejecting it. This restriction guarantees that the
proposer’s maximization problem is always well deﬁned. Note, however, that the restriction binds
only in those states where the proposer is indiﬀerent between proposing an allocation and passing.Majority Rule 16
Let C = {v ∈ I Rn
+ :
Pn
i=1 vi ≤ s} and deﬁne the set-valued mapping T(.;q) on C
as
T(v;q) = {g ∈ I R
n : ∃r ∈ r(v;q),∃α ∈ α(r,v)
such that g = A(v;α,r)}. (8)
Note that the operator T is indexed by q since r(.) is indexed by q while α(.) and A(.)
are independent of q (although, in equilibrium, they depend on q through r). The
next theorem provides an alternative characterization of the SSP payoﬀs that will be
useful in the rest of the paper.
Theorem 2. v is an SSP payoﬀ vector for the q-quota game if and only if it is a
ﬁxed point of the set-valued mapping T(v;q), that is v ∈ T(v;q).
Proof: The result follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the deﬁnition of T(.;q).
We can now establish the existence of SSP payoﬀs.
Theorem 3. There exists an SSP payoﬀ vector.
Proof: First note that T(.;q) maps C to non-empty subsets of C. It is easily seen
that T(v;q) is convex for all v since r(.;q) and α(.;q) are convex valued. Furthermore,
T(.;q) is upper semi-continuous since r(.;q) and α(.;q) are upper semi-continuous andMajority Rule 17
A is continuous in v, α and r. Finally, for all v ∈ C, T(v;q) is a closed subset of the
compact set C and hence, T(v;q) is compact. Thus, the result follows from Kakutani
Fixed Point Theorem.
Theorem 3 proves the existence of an SSP payoﬀ vector in mixed strategies where
the proposer is allowed to randomize over the selection of his coalition partners. Unlike
under the unanimity rule (Merlo and Wilson [13]), under general q-quota agreement
rules an SSP payoﬀ in pure strategies does not necessarily exist. To illustrate this
point consider the following example. There are 3 players, a deterministic surplus of
size 1, the discount factor is β = 0.95, the proposer selection probabilities are p1 = 0.2,
p2 = 0.3 and p3 = 0.5, and the agreement rule is majority rule. In this example, the
unique SSP payoﬀ vector is v = (0.328, 0.328, 0.344). In equilibrium, player 1 always
oﬀers to player 2, player 2 always oﬀers to player 1, and player 3 randomizes (he oﬀers
to player 1 with probability 0.62 and to player 2 with probability 0.38). It is easy to
verify that no equilibrium in pure strategy exists in this example.
4. Non Uniqueness of SSP Payoﬀs
In this section, we address the issue of uniqueness of the SSP payoﬀs. For the class of
games we consider here, when q = n (i.e., in the unanimity game), Merlo and Wilson
[13] show that the SSP payoﬀ is unique. The same result holds for any q-quota game
where the surplus to be divided is constant over time (Baron and Ferejohn [3] and
Eraslan [7]). We show that in general, for stochastic q-quota bargaining games the
SSP payoﬀ need not be unique. To illustrate this point we present an example whereMajority Rule 18
in a game with majority rule there are multiple equilibrium payoﬀs even when the
players are symmetric, that is, pi = 1/n for all i ∈ N (the case considered by Baron
and Ferejohn [3]).
Before presenting the example, we ﬁrst provide a simpler characterization of the
set of SSP payoﬀs for the case where players are symmetric. It is easy to show that
when all players are equally likely to be selected as proposer they have the same SSP
payoﬀ.16 Let v denote the (common) SSP payoﬀ to a player. For any v ∈ [0, ¯ s/n], let





1 if s > qv
0 if s < qv
(9)
















Lemma 1. When the players are symmetric, v is an SSP payoﬀ for the q-quota game
if and only if v ∈ ¯ T(v;q).
16This result follows from the fact that for any two players i and j, pi ≤ pj implies that vi ≤ vj.
The proof of this intuitive result is omitted and is available from the authors upon request.Majority Rule 19
Proof: First suppose that v is an SSP payoﬀ for the q-quota game. Observe
that when the players are symmetric, the optimized value of the objective function of
program (2) for player i (that is, the sum of the shares of surplus player i has to give to
his coalition partners in order to induce acceptance of his proposal) is equal to (q−1)v
for all i ∈ N regardless of the oﬀer probabilities. Thus, the proposal probabilities
αi(s) do not depend on the proposer and can be written as in (9). In other words, even
if the players do not employ symmetric strategies, the proposal probabilities satisfy
(9) and the right hand side of (9) does not depend on the identity of the proposer. For
any v, let ¯ α(s) =
Pn
i=1 piαi(s). Then ¯ α(s) also satisﬁes (9). To see that v ∈ ¯ T(v;q)
note that since v is an SSP payoﬀ for the q-quota game, by Theorem 2, v ∈ Ti(ve;q)
for all i, where e is the n-dimensional unit vector and Ti(.;.) is the ith component of





i=1 Ti(ve;q))/n = ¯ T(v;q). Thus, v ∈ ¯ T(v;q).






+ (1 − α(s))v]dF(s).
Let α = (α,...,α). It suﬃces to ﬁnd SSP oﬀer probabilities r ∈ r(v;q) such
that v = Ai(ve;α,r). Let rij = (q − 1)/(n − 1) for all i and for all j 6= i. It is
straightforward to verify that r ∈ r(v;q) and v = Ai(ve;α,r). Since, as explained
above, the proposal probabilities do not depend on r it is clear that v ∈ Ti(ve;q) for
all i. Thus, v is an SSP payoﬀ for the q-quota game by Theorem 2.Majority Rule 20
Consider the following example. There are 3 players with equal proposer selection
probabilities pi = 1/3, for all i ∈ N. The common discount factor β is equal to 0.99.
There are two possible sizes of the surplus, S = {1,2}. Each state is realized with
equal probability, Pr[s = 1] = Pr[s = 2] = 0.5.
Note that in equilibrium agreement always occurs when the large level of surplus is
realized. Then, there are three possible outcomes to consider: (i) agreement occurs on
the large surplus level only; (ii) agreement occurs on both surplus levels; or (iii) when
the small level of surplus is realized agreement occurs with some positive probability
(not equal to one). Let v0, v00, and v000 denote the payoﬀs corresponding to each of
these three outcomes, respectively. We show that when the agreement rule is majority
rule (i.e., q = 2) all three outcomes can occur in equilibrium.
Consider ﬁrst v0. By Lemma 1, for any q ∈ {1,2,3}, v0 is an SSP payoﬀ for the













0 < 2, (11)
and
qv
0 > 1. (12)
From (10) we obtain v0 = 0.653. It is easy to see that the inequality in (11) is satisﬁed
for all q while the inequality in (12) is violated for q = 1. Hence, v0 is an SSP payoﬀ forMajority Rule 21
the q-quota game if and only if q ≥ 2. The proposer’s SSP strategy that induces this
payoﬀ is such that α(1) = 0, α(2) = 1, and, for example, rij = 0.5 for all i,j = 1,2,3
and i 6= j.















00 < 2, (14)
and
qv
00 < 1. (15)
Solving (13) we obtain v00 = 0.495, which implies that the inequality in (14) is satisﬁed
for all q, while the inequality in (15) is satisﬁed only if q ≤ 2. Hence, v00 is an SSP
payoﬀ for the q-quota game if and only if q ≤ 2. The proposer’s SSP strategy that
induces this payoﬀ is such that α(1) = 1, α(2) = 1, and, for example, rij = 0.5 for all
i,j = 1,2,3 and i 6= j.
Finally, observe that, by Lemma 1, v000 is an SSP payoﬀ for the q-quota game, if
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and
qv
000 = 1. (18)
From (18) we obtain v000 = 1/q, which implies that the inequality in (17) is satisﬁed
for all q. Also, it is easy to see that the value of α such that (16) holds is in the unit
interval only if q = 2. Hence, v000 is an SSP equilibrium payoﬀ for the q-quota game
if and only if q = 2. In this equilibrium, v000 = 0.5. The proposer’s SSP strategy that
induces this payoﬀ is such that α(1) = 0.94, α(2) = 1, and, for example, rij = 0.5 for
all i,j = 1,2,3 and i 6= j.
This example illustrates that while in the unanimity game (i.e., when q = 3)
there is a unique equilibrium payoﬀ, in the game where agreement requires approval
of a simple majority (i.e., when q = 2) there are three equilibrium payoﬀs. Similar
examples can be constructed where multiple SSP payoﬀs arise for any q-quota game
(with q < n).
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the unanimity game, agreement occurs
only when the large level of surplus is realized. In this game, since all players have
veto power, they all have a common interest to maximize the expected surplus to be
allocated and hence delay agreement until the large level of surplus is realized. Under
other agreement rules, when agreement only requires approval of q < n players, in
any equilibrium only q players receive a positive share of the surplus. This creates
an asymmetry between the players who are included in a proposal (i.e., those who
are allocated a positive share) and the players who are excluded (i.e., those who areMajority Rule 23
allocated a zero share). This asymmetry generates an incentive for players who are
oﬀered a positive share of the surplus today to agree even if the current level of surplus
is small, since some of them (perhaps all) may be excluded from future agreements.
Knowing that his proposal would be accepted, the same argument may then induce
a proposer to make a proposal when the small level of surplus is realized.
Note that in the previous example two of the equilibria with majority rule are ex-
ante ineﬃcient. In fact, when q = 1 the unique equilibrium in a q-quota game is ex-
ante ineﬃcient. We turn our attention to eﬃciency and to comparing the equilibrium
outcomes of games with diﬀerent agreement rules next.
5. Comparing Agreement Rules
When players are asymmetric with respect to their probability of being selected as
proposer, the comparison of individual equilibrium payoﬀs across games with diﬀerent
agreement rules is uninformative. This point can easily be illustrated through an
example given in Baron and Ferejohn [3], where the level of surplus is ﬁxed and equal
to one, and there are three players with discount factor equal to 0.8 and with proposer
selection probabilities equal to 0.2, 0.35, and 0.45, respectively. In this example, the
unique SSP payoﬀ vector of the q-quota game is v = (0.2, 0.35, 0.45) when q = 1
or q = 3, and is v = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) when q = 2. Moreover, as illustrated in the
previous section, when the level of surplus is stochastic there can be multiple equilibria
depending on the agreement rule even when the proposer selection probabilities are
the same for all players. This makes the comparison of equilibrium payoﬀs acrossMajority Rule 24
games with diﬀerent agreement rules problematic.
In this section, we show that the SSP total payoﬀ (deﬁned as the sum of the
individual SSP payoﬀs) in any equilibrium of a q-quota game where q < n is never
larger than the SSP total payoﬀ in the unique equilibrium of the unanimity game.
This inequality is strict if the level of surplus in any period is a random draw from a
continuous density over the support S = [0,s].
Let w ∈ [0, ¯ s] denote an SSP total payoﬀ for the q-quota game if there is an SSP
payoﬀ v for the q-quota game such that w =
Pn
i=1 vi. Recall that C = {v ∈ I Rn
+ :
Pn























Theorem 4. If w is an SSP total payoﬀ for the q-quota game then w ∈ H(w;q).
Proof: Suppose w is an SSP total payoﬀ for the q-quota game. Then by deﬁnition
there exists an SSP payoﬀ v for the q-quota game such that w =
Pn
i=1 vi. By Theorem
2, v ∈ T(v;q). Thus, there exists r ∈ r(v;q) and α ∈ α(r,v) such that vi = Ai(v;α,r).
Hence, w =
Pn
i=1 Ai(v;α,r) which in turn implies that w ∈ H(w;q).
Note that when q = n (i.e., the agreement rule is unanimity), the equilibriumMajority Rule 25
oﬀer probabilities must satisfy rij = 1 for all i and for all j 6= i. This implies that






1 if s >
Pn
j=1 vj




This implies that the set of agreement states does not depend on the proposer except
when s =
Pn
j=1 vj. In this case, however, the total payoﬀ does not depend on whether
the proposer passes or proposes an allocation that will be accepted. Thus, abusing




which is the same operator used by Merlo and Wilson [13] to characterize the SSP
total payoﬀs of stochastic games with unanimity rule.
Theorem 5. If w ∈ H(w;n) then w is the unique SSP total payoﬀ for the unanimity
game.
Proof: It can be veriﬁed that H(.;n) is a contraction mapping (see Merlo and
Wilson [13]). Thus, H(.;n) has a unique ﬁxed point, say w. If w is not an SSP total
payoﬀ for the unanimity game, there exists an SSP total payoﬀ w0 for the unanimity
game such that w 6= w0. By Theorem 4, w0 = H(w0;n) which is a contradiction.Majority Rule 26
Note that for the unanimity game the operator H(.;n) fully characterizes the SSP
total payoﬀ. For a game with a general q-quota agreement rule this is not the case.
In fact, it is possible to have w ∈ H(w;q) even though w is not an SSP total payoﬀ
for the q-quota game.
Theorem 6. Let wn be the SSP total payoﬀ for the unanimity game and let wq be
an SSP total payoﬀ for the q-quota game. Then wn ≥ wq. Furthermore, if the level
of surplus in any period is a random draw from a continuous density over the support
S = [0,s], then wn > wq.








To see the last inequality is true observe the following. Since wq is an SSP total payoﬀ












Note that s ≥ wq implies αi(s) = 1 for all i while the converse is not true. In
particular, it is possible to have max{s,wq} = wq > s while
Pn
i=1 αi(s)pi > 0 by





i=1 αi(s)pi).Majority Rule 27
Next note that H(.;n) is a contraction that maps [wq, ¯ s] to itself. Thus H(.;n) has
a ﬁxed point in this set. But wn is the unique ﬁxed point of H(.;n) and hence wn ≥ wq.
When the level of surplus in any period is a random draw from a continuous density
over the support S = [0,s], it can be veriﬁed that H(wq;n) > wq. Since wn ≥ wq,
and wq is not a ﬁxed point of H(.;n) it must be the case that wn > wq.
For the class of games we consider, Merlo and Wilson [13] show that the unique
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the unanimity game is ex-ante eﬃcient.
Theorem 6 implies that the equilibrium outcomes of a stochastic bargaining game
with a q-quota rule may be ex-ante ineﬃcient. An interesting feature of this result is
that the ineﬃciency arises because players may reach an agreement “too soon”. This
phenomenon is due to the fact that, ceteris paribus, it is “cheaper” for a proposer to
obtain the votes of q players (including himself) rather than n players. Furthermore,
ceteris paribus, each player has a lower continuation payoﬀ when agreement requires
less than unanimous approval, because of the possibility of being excluded from future
agreements. These two factors may induce agreements to occur on “sub-optimal”
levels of surplus.
6. Concluding Remarks
It should be clear from our analysis that the source of multiplicity and ineﬃciency of
equilibria in q-quota stochastic bargaining games derives from a limitation on the set
of contracts agents are allowed to sign. If agents have a complete set of contingent
contracts at their disposal, then none of these issues would arise (see Merlo andMajority Rule 28
Wilson [12]). In particular, in the speciﬁc context we are considering, to guarantee
uniqueness and eﬃciency of the equilibrium it would be suﬃcient to allow agents
to sign binding contracts specifying the composition of the coalition they restrict
themselves to bargain with over time. While this option is certainly interesting,
we believe there are many real bargaining situations where such contracts are not
available.Majority Rule 29
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